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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
CRIMINAL LAW: Double Jeopardy
In United Stated States v. Wheeler, 545 F.2d 1255 (9th Cir. 1976),
the circuit court affirmed a district court decision that a Navajo Indian who pled guilty in tribal court to charges of contributing to
the delinquency of a minor and disorderly conduct could not be
later tried on federal charges of carnal knowledge of a female Indian under the age of sixteen years where the tribal court charge is
a lesser included offense of the federal charge. Such action would
violate the fifth amendment double jeopardy clause of the Constitution, according to the court. In Circuit Judge Sneed's opinion,
he stated that tribal courts and federal courts are, in effect, arms of
the same sovereign, not separate sovereigns as are states and the
federal government. Analogizing to cases in which it was held that
one may not be tried on the same charges in both territorial courts
and military courts, nor in both municipal and state courts, Judge
Sneed held that the double jeopardy proscription applies equally
to tribal and federal courts. The court further held that in accordance with Supreme Court cases, where one is charged with a
crime that is a lesser included offense of a crime with which he has
already been charged in another court of the same sovereign, the
double jeopardy provision of the Constitution is thereby violated.
DUE PROCESS: Participation in Tribal Awards
In Delaware Tribal Business Comittee v. Weeks, - U.S.-, 97 S.
Ct. 911, (1977), an Act of Congress had provided for distribution
of funds to certain Delaware Indians pursuant to an award by the
Indian Claims Commission based on an 1854 treaty violation by
the United States. The "Kansas Delawares" in 1866 separated from
the main tribe and are not a federally recognized tribe today. The
Kansas Delawares were excluded from the award, even though
they were lineal descendants of the Delaware Tribe as it existed at
the time of the treaty violation in 1854. The Kansas Delawares
were granted an injunction against distribution of the funds on the
grounds that their exclusion was a denial of due process under the
fifth amendment. The Supreme Court held that the award was
made to the tribal entity of which the Kansas Delawares were no
longer a part due to the 1866 treaty (Treaty of 1866, 14 Stat. 793).
The Court further held that the exclusion of the Kansas Delawares
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had occurred before, which indicated that Congress had
historically distinguished them from the tribal entity and also that
the exclusion was justified in order to prevent substantial administrative problems it thought would attach to wider distribution. On this basis, the Court found that the exclusion was constitutional and was "tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress'
unique obligation toward the Indians." (Morton v. Mancari, 417
U.S. 535 (1974)) Justice Stevens dissented, stating that the
"statutory exclusion of the Kansas Delawares from any share in
the fund.., is manifestly unjust and arbitrary." He concluded that
based on the facts there was no need for discrimination within the
class, that there was no principled justification for the discrimination, and that there was no reason to believe that the discrimination was the product of actual legislative choice but due rather to a
legislative accident.
INDIAN LANDS: State Power of Eminent Domain
In Plains Electric Generation & Transmission Co-op v. Pueblo of
Laguna, 542 F.2d 1375 (10th Cir. 1976), a condemnation action
was brought under the state of New Mexico's power of eminent
domain. An Act of Congress, Act of May 10, 1926, 44 Stat. 498,
provided, in essence, that lands of the Pueblo Indians of New
Mexico may be condemned for any purpose consistent with state
law. The Pueblo appealed an adverse decision and challenged the
validity of the 1926 Act. The court held that although there had
been no express repeal of the Act by Congress, the Act was repealed "by implication." The repeal by implication was based on the
fact that the 1926 Act was irreconcilably in conflict with later acts
and that later acts cover the whole subject of the earlier Act and
were intended as a substitute. Therefore, it was held that the
district court lacked jurisdiction to hear a case based on state condemnation under the 1926 Act.
INDIAN LANDS: Federal Power of Eminent Domain
In United States v. Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska, 542 F.2d 1002
(8th Cir. 1976), the United States brought suit to acquire by eminent domain certain Indian lands for use in a recreation project.
The Winnebago Tribe appealed a finding of the district court that
the United States has the authority to condemn the tribe's land.
On appeal it was undisputed that Congress has the power to
abrogate treaties which set aside lands for Indian tribes in order to
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permit the taking of those lands by eminent domain. However, the
court held that Congress had never exercised that power. The
court stated that rights secured by treaty will not be deemed
abrogated or modified absent a "clear expression" of congressional
purpose. Lacking any reference to abrogation of the Winnebago
Treaty of 1865 for such a purpose in either committee reports or
statutory language, Indian lands were held not to be available for
acquisition by eminent domain.
INDIAN RESERVATIONS: Hunting
In United States v. Sanford,547 F.2d 1085 (9th Cir. 1976), the appellees were hunting guides who took two hunters onto the Crow
Indian Reservation in Montana for the purpose of hunting elk.
The "hunters" were persons acting under the auspices of the
Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife and authorized to do
whatever was necessary to complete their investigations. The appellees were charged with trespass on the Crow Reservation,
violation of the Lacey Act [18 U.S.C. § 43] prohibiting interstate
transportation of illegally killed animals, and conspiracy to
violate the Lacey Act. The government appealed a dismissal of the
indictment and the Ninth Circuit Court reversed, holding that 18
U.S.C. § 1165 proscribes unauthorized entry onto an Indian reservation for the purpose of hunting, trapping, or removal of game,
and that the participation of undercover agents did not constitute
an authorization for the appellee's trespass or in any other manner
make lawful what would otherwise be an unlawful trespass. The
court also refused to accept appellee's argument that 18 U.S.C. §
1165 does not extend to the activities of hunting guides. The circuit court did state, however, that 18 U.S.C. § 1165 does not
directly prohibit hunting and fishing on Indian reservations but
makes the act of going on the reservation for that purpose illegal.
The Lacey Act, prohibiting the interstate transportation of illegally killed animals, requires an illegal killing for conviction under
the Act. The government argued that the killing of the elk was illegal under Section 1165, but the circuit court held that Section
1165 was not an attempt to regulate hunting and fishing and was a
mere trespass statute. Therefore, Section 1165 could not be used as
a predicate for a conviction under the Lacey Act. The court found
that there was no illegal killing by the appellees under either Section 1165 or under state law, but remanded, stating that if the
undercover agents were without state authorization to make kills,
then any kills would be illegal on the part of the agents. This
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would support an indictment against the appellees under the Lacey
Act. The circuit court reversed the dismissal of the conspiracy
counts, citing traditional conspiracy theories.
JURISDICTION: Viability of Tribal Jurisdiction Over NonIndians
In Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d1007 (9th Cir. 1976), Oliphant appealed a denial of a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that a tribal
court had no criminal jurisdiction over him. Oliphant was a nonIndian arrested on the Suquamish Reservation in Washington. In
affirming the district court's denial of the writ, the circuit court
considered first, what the original sovereign powers of the tribe
were, and then, how far and in what respect the powers had been
limited. Initially, the court held, criminal jurisdiction was an inherent power of the sovereignty that the Suquamish originally
possessed. That sovereign power could only be modified or terminated by a relevant treaty or congressional action. Two treaties
between the United States and the Suquamish were cited and
neither relinquished any criminal jurisdiction. Several statutes
were argued by Oliphant to support his position. The court found
that 18 U.S.C. § 1152, which extends federal enclave law to Indian
country, neither declared exclusive federal jurisdiction nor extinguished tribal jurisdiction. Oliphant also argued under the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. Section 1302, but the
court held that the statute merely applies certain due process
limitations on the exercise of criminal jurisdiction, but does not
withdraw it. The court also found that although the state of
Washington had at one time assumed criminal jurisdiction over
Indian country within the state by virtue of federal law,
Washington had since proclaimed retrocession of that power
under applicable federal law. The court found that even if
retrocession were invalid under state law, federal law controlled.
TAXATION: State Taxation of Non-Indian Lessees of Indian
Lands
In Fort Mojave Tribe v. San Bernadino County, 543 F.2d 1253
(97th Cir. 1976), the Indian tribe appealed a California District
Court decision upholding a county possessory interest tax
imposed on non-Indian lessees of tribal lands. After deciding that
state action had not been preempted by federal legislation, the
court applied the test of Williams v. Lee, [358 U.S. 217 (1958)] to
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determine whether a state statute not otherwise preempted is invalid. Williams held that "absent governing Acts of Congress, the
question has always been whether the state action infringed on the
right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled
by them." The Williams test protects state interests up to the point
where tribal self-government would be affected. The court here
held that any interference with tribal self-government was not
serious, that no Indian or Indian land was subjected to direct state
court process, and that the only effect of the tax on Indians was an
"indirect economic burden," which would perhaps reduce the
revenues on their leases. The lessee would be liable for the tax and
no Indian could be taken into court as was the case in Williams.
TRIBES: Jurisdiction of Dispute Between Hopi and Navajo
Sekaquaptewa v. MacDonald,544 F.2d396 (9th Cir. 1976), is the
most recent development growing out of the long-standing HopiNavajo feud concerning joint use areas of the Hopi and Navajo
reservations. Prior judicial and congressional action had resulted
in the Navajo being ordered to reduce the number of livestock
grazing in the joint use area and being cited for contempt for
failure to comply. In 1974 Congress passed an act which directed
the Secretary of Interior to commence the reduction of livestock.
The Navajo then asserted that the district court no longer had
jurisdiction to grant relief with respect to livestock reduction as
the circuit court decided it did in Hamilton v. Naka [453 F.2d 152
(1974)]. The Court of appeals decided that this argument was erroneous and that the 1974 act in no way affected the district
court's jurisdiction and, therefore the original plan requiring
reduction remained effective without any extension of time. The
circuit court also decided that court action cancelling grazing permits violated the Administrative Procedures Act requiring notice
and hearing (5 U.S.C. § 706). However, the court held that those
procedures were not applicable because the district court was
vested with the authority to determine grazing rights, not an agency.
TRIBAL COURTS: Exhaustion Doctrine
In St. Marks v. Chippewa-Cree Tribe of Rocky Boy, 545 F. 2d
1188 (9th Cir. 1976), the plaintiff had been barred by the tribal
court from running for tribal judge in one election and for tribal
council in another election. He was barred for failure to satisfy the
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physical residency requirement in both instances. The plaintiff
challenged that requirement in tribal court with respect to the second election and sued in district court with respect to the first
election. The district court dismissed the action on the grounds
that the plaintiff had not exhausted his tribal remedies. While the
district court action was still in process, the plaintiff had been
dismissed from the tribal action, the tribal court apparently
holding the residency requirement valid. The Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals held that the plaintiff satisfied the jurisdictional
precondition of exhaustion of tribal remedies as specified in the Indian Civil Rights Act (25 U.S.C. § 1302), even though the precondition was satisfied after the invocation of federal court aid rather
than before. The court distinguished an earlier Ninth Circuit case,
Howlett v. Salish & Kootenai Tribes [529 F.2d 233 (9th Cir. 1976)]
(see Recent Developments, Vol. IV, No. 1), stating that the time
element here was not in issue in that case. The court stated that the
exhaustion requirement was not inflexible and was imposed to further the congressional goals of preserving and strengthening
Native American cultures by insuring that tribal institutions are
not denied the opportunity to resolve tribal disputes or make
tribal policy.
The court set up a test to determine when the exhaustion
remedy will be required. First, it must be determined whether any
meaningful tribal remedy exists; second, if such a remedy does exist, it must be determined whether it in any way serves the purpose
for which it was intended; and third, if it does serve such a purpose, the need to preserve and strengthen tribal institutions must
be balanced against the need to immediately adjudicate alleged
deprivations of individual rights. In applying the test to this case,
the court held that no balancing was necessary because the tribal
court had already ruled on physical residency requirements and
no purpose would be served by requiring the tribal court to repeat
its ruling. Consequently, the exhaustion requirement was fulfilled
albeit after resort was had to a federal court.
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